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A. Ko. 21701. In Bank. Aug. 24, 1951.]

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant, v. J. A. McCLURKEN
et al., Respondents.
Zoning
Existing Nonconforming Uses.- The utilization of
four new
storage tanks increasing storage tank camore than five times is not a mere continuance of an
nonconforming use which, when exempted by a zoning
ordinance, consisted of the intermittent storage of lumber and
scrap metal, preliminary grading, steel beam storage and the
use of movable gasoline storage tanks.
[2) !d.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-Even if new gasoline storage tanks are utilized for an original nonconforming
industrial use exempted by a zoning ordinance, they constitute
an unwarranted enlargement of such nonconforming use consisting of the intermittent storage of lumber and scrap metal,
preliminary grading, steel beam storage and use of movable
gasoline storage tanks, where the new storage capacity is more
than five times the old, the tanks are double the size of the
largest original and are permanently affixed in a residential
zone.
[3] Id.- New Nonconforming Use.- The utilization of gasoline
storage tanks as an incident to a service station erected after
adoption of a zoning ordinance is not merely the expansion
of a previously existing nonconforming use, consisting of the
utilization of smaller movable storage tanks for supplying
power incident to industrial use, but is a new use.
[4) !d.-Continuance of Nonconforming Use.--The continuance of
a nonconforming use permitted by a zoning ordinance is a
continuance of the same use.
[5] !d.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-It would be an unwarranted discrimination in favor of certain property owners
to permit them, by enlarging their permitted nonconforming
use, to construct gasoline storage tanks in a residential zone
in which they are prohibited.
[6] Id.- Structural Alterations.- Construction of new storage
tanks in a residential zone is prohibited by an ordinance forbidding structural alterations of a building used for a permitted
nonconforming use, since such tanks are buildings within the
ordinance and a prohibition of structural alterations, although
not precluding routine repair and maintenance, does preclude
erection of new buildings.
See 12 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. 160; 58 Am.Jur. 1021.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-12] Zoning.
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running south from the C-1 zone for an additional 330 feet;
and a residential district, R-2-A,
south from the
C-1 zone, which included one third of defendants' land.
In 1948 defendants erected a retail
station near
the intersection of Broadway and Massachusetts A venue. The
service station was within the area zoned for retail
which permitted that use. Defendants also erected four tanks
to provide storage facilities for the service station. Ll\lthough
the tanks are near the service station, they extend approximately 50 feet within the area zoned for residences. Before
1942 steel beams and trusses had been stored on this corner
and there was a preliminary leveling of the land and a service
road made thereon. There is no disagreement among any of
the witnesses, however, that until the tanks in question were
erected there were no permanent structures of any kind on
this corner before or after 1942.
The trial court concluded that the tanks were permitted
under a provision of the ordinance exempting nonconforming
uses existing at the time of its adoption.
Section 17 of Ordinance 371, incorporated by reference in
Ordinance 268 (New Series) provides:
"The lawful use of land existing at the time of the passage
of this ordinance, although such use does not conform to the
provisions hereof, may be continued; if such nonconforming
use is discontinued any future use of said land shall be in
conformity with the provisions of this ordinance.''
Such a provision is ordinarily included in zoning ordinances because of the hardship and doubtful constitutionality
of compelling the immediate discontinuance of nonconforming
uses. (See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304 [295
P. 14].) "The object of such a provision is the gradual elimination of the nonconforming use by obsolescence or destruction by fire or the elements, and it has been frequently upheld
by the courts." (Rehfeld v. San Prancisco, 218 Cal. 83, 84
[21 P.2d 419].) There is a growing tendency to guard against
the indefinite continuance of nonconforming uses by providing
for their liquidation within a prescribed period. (See 35
Va.L.Rev. 348, 356; Standard O£l Co. v. City of Tallahassee,
183 F.2d 410, 413, cert. den., 340 U.S. 892 [71 S.Ct. 208,
95 L.Ed. 647] ; State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald,
168 La. 172 [121 So. 613], cert. den. 280 U.S. 556 [50 S.Ct.
16, 74 L.Ed. 612]; State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby,
168 La. 752 [123 So. 314].)
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Given the
of zoning to eliminate nonconforming
uses, eomts throughout the country generally follow a strict
against their extension or enlargement. 1
[1] rrhe evidence most favorable to defendants is that in
their
usc they utilized fuel tanks that were
skid timbers from place to place as they
were JwedecL One tank had a capacity of 1,200 gallons, another
and the largest a capacity of 6,000 gallons.
have four new tanks with a capacity of
each, that are 32 feet high and 8 feet in
diameter and are permanently located upon a rectangular
concrete base 10 feet wide and 54 feet long. In erecting
four new tanks double the size of the largest of the old,
defendants ha Ye not only increased their fuel storage capacity
more than :five times but have permanently affixed the tanks
within the area zoned for residences. Such a formidable expansion can hardly be viewed as a mere continuance of the
nonconforming use consisting of the intermittent storage of
'Rehfeld v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 85 [21 P.2d 419]; Burke v.
Cit!! of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.App.2d 189, 191 [156 P.2d 28]; Yuba City v.
Cherniavsky, 117 Cal.App. i368, 573 [4 P.2d 299]; Wilson v. Edgar, 64
Cal.App. 634, 607 [222 P. 623]; De Felice v. East Haven, 130 Conn. 156
[32 A.2d 635, 147 A.L.R. 161]; Piccolo v. West Haven, 120 Conn. 449
I HiJ A. 610, 617]; Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15 [157 A.
273, 276]; Ware v. Wichita, 118 Kan. 265 [234 P. 978]; Goodrich v.
Sclligman, 298 Ky. 803 [183 S.W.2d 625, 627]; Dorman v. Baltimore,
187 :\1d. G7S [ii1 A.2d 638, 661]; Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652 [47 A.2d
613, 615·61G]; Beyer v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444
[34 A.:Cd 765, 769]; Connors v. Town of Burlington (1950), Mass.
[!ll N.E.2d 212, 213]; Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy, 320
:Yiass. 207 f 68 N.E.2d 918, 919]; Town of B arlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass.
21G [61 N.E.2d 243, 247, 168 A.L.R. 1181]; Town of Marblehead v.
Rosenthal, 31G :\lass. 124 [:'i5 N.E.2d 13]; Town of Lexington v. Bean,
272 Mass. 547 fl72 N.E. 867, 870]; Cole v. City of Battle Creelc, 298
Mich. 9S [298 N.W. 466, 468]; Austin v. Older, 283 :Mich. 667 [278 N.W.
727, 720]; TVo1nen's Christian Ass'n. of Kansas City v. Brown, 354
l\Io. 700 [190 S.W.2d 900, 906]; In re Botz, 236 l\fo.App. 566 [159
S.W.2d 367, 371-373]; Lynch v. Borough of H'illsdale, 136 N ..J.L. 129
[54 A.2d 723, 725-726]; Albright v. Johnson, 135 N ..J.h 70 [50 A.2d
399]; Bunnorc Co. v. Smith, 124 N ..J.L. 541 [12 A.2d 353, 356]; Home
Fuel Oil Co. v. Glen Rock, 118 N ..J.L. 340 [192 A. 516, 518]; De Vito v.
Pearsall, 115 N ..J.L. 323 [ISO A. 202]; Conaway v. Atlantic City, 107
N ..J.L. 404 [154 A. 6]; Village of Ossining v. Meredith, 73 N.Y.S.2d
897; People v. Giorgi, 16 N.Y.S.2d 923; Pisicchio v. Board of Appeals,
16.3 Misc. Jil6 [300 N.Y.S. 368, 3691; State ex rel. City Ice g. Fuel Co. v.
Stegner, 120 Ohio St. 418 [166 N.E. 226, 227, 64 A.L.R. 916]; Appeal
of Kiddy, 294 Pa. 209 P43 A. 909); Appeal of Yocom, 142 Pa. Super.
165 [15 A.2d 687, 689-69.0]; Meserolo v. Board of .Adjustment, City of
Dallas, ('rex. Civ. App.) 172 S.W.2d 528, 530-531; Benjamin v. Lietz,
--·Utah--- [211 P.2d 449, 451]; see 147 A.L.R. 167; 8 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, 3d ed. 1950, § 25.183, pp. 366-367.
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industrial use had been reached. [7] The purpose of the
landovvner in purchasing the property must yield to the public interest in the enforcement of a comprehensive* zoning
plan. (Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332,
337 [ 171 P .2d 542] ; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.2d 341, 344
[115 P.2d 455]; 81mny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena,
1 Cal.2d 87, 93-94 [33 P.2d 672) ; cf. Skalko v. City
Sunnyvale, 14 Cal.2d 213, 215 [93 P.2d 93] .) [8] The intention to
expand the business in the future does not give defendants
the right to expand a nonconforming use. (Town of Billerica v.
Quinn, 320 Mass. 687 [71 N.E.2d 235, 236] ; Chayt v. Board
of Zoning Appeals of Balthnore City, 17 Mel. 426 [9 A.2d 747,
750) ; Appeal of Kiddy, S1(pra, note 1.) The ordinance has
made allowance for the continuance of nonconforming uses
existent in 1942 ; it does not permit the enlargement of such
uses as the owners find expansion desirable. It is immaterial
that a property owner in an area zoned for residential purposes contemplated the maximum commercial utilization of
his property previous to the zoning ordinance. (Sunny Slope
1Yater Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal.2d 87, 95 [33 P.2d 672);
O'Rourke v. 1'eeter·s, 63 Cal.App.2d 349, 352 [146 P.2d 983];
Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 36 F.2d 242,
244; 47 F.2d 528, 534, cert. den. 284 U.S. 634 [52 S.Ct. 18,
76 L.Ed. 540]; Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153 [214
P. 99] ; Spector v. B1iilding Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63
[145 N.E. 265] ; Chayt v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City, snpra.) Although defendants are confined in their
nonconforming use to the activities carried on at the time
their property was zoned, they enjoy a favored position compared to those who purchased property for a nonconforming
use and were prevented from using it at all for that purpose
because their proprrty was zoned before they could establish
such a use.
Defrndants rely on In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368 [77 P. 180]
and Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 224 [25 S.Ct. 18,
49 L.Ed. 169]. In the Smith case the gas works had been
erected before the passage of the ordinance. It exemplifies
the rule that a lawful use existing at the time a zoning ordinance becomes effective cannot be prohibited when it is not a
public nuisance. In the Dobbins case the owner undertook
construction of a gas works in a permitted area and expended
some $2,500 in erecting the foundation before a zoning ordinance was passed prohibiting gas works in that district.
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[9] If an owner has legally undertaken the construction of
a building before the effective date of a zoning ordinance, he
may complete the building and use it for the purpose designed
after the effective date of the ordinance. (City of Coldwater v.
Williams Oil
288Mich. 140 [284 N.W. 675]; Best & Co. v.
Garden
286 N.Y.S. 980, aff'd.
27:3 N.Y. 564 [7 N.E.2d 694] .) Protection of an undertaking
involving the investment of capital, the purchase of equipment, and the employment of workers, is akin to protection
of a nonconforming usc existing at the time that zoning restrictions become effective. [10] The same principle underlies the rule that a permittee who has expended substantial
sums under a permit cannot be deprived by a subsequent
zoning ordinance of the right to complete construction and
to use the premises as authorized by the permit. (TransOceanic Oil Corp. v. Santa Barbara, 85 Cal.App.2d 776 [194
P.2d 148] ; Sandenburgh v. 1Vlichigarnrne Oil Co., 249 Mich.
372 [228 N.W. 707] ; Atlantic Broadcasting Co. v. Wayne
Tp., 109 N .•J.L. 442 [162 A. 631]; Nassau-Fulton Realty Corp.
v. Schlimm, 67 N.Y.S.2d 501; People v. Bales, 224 App.Div.
87 [229 N.Y.S. 550] .)
Defendants contend that they are being discriminated
against on the ground that neighboring owners were granted
variances and that over half the lands within a radius of the
intersection of Broadway and Massachusetts A venue were
being used for heavy industrial purposes. There was a sharp
conflict in the evidence as to the extent and nature of the
other nonconforming uses in this area. The trial court made
no finding on this issue, and the evidence does not establish
unjust discrimination as a matter of law. No zonng ordinance
can classify districts with perfect justice. Since cases of
unusual hardship may require variances, zoning authoritirs
are usually given power to grant them. [11] The fact that
variances may have been granted to some owners and denied
to others, however, does not establish unreasonable discrimination. [12] 'rhe granting or denial of variances rests
largely in the discretion of the body designated by the zoning
ordinance for that purpose, and a denial of a variance will not
be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of
discretion. (Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 Cal.2d 119 [104
P.2d 1041] ; Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.App.2d 605,
613 [126 P.2d 954] ; Larkin Co., Inc. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330,
336 [151 N.E. 637, 639]. As to the degree of discretion
vested in such bodies, see Lockard v. Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d

of the issues
For the reasons stated I woulu
trial court.
Shenk, J., concurred.
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Have you changed your use
our
are
identical." (Italics added.) In other words, defendants were
engaged in a highly diversified business which embraced selling, manufacturing, storing and repairing a wide variety of
things, and to conduct that business, maintained all sorts of
equipment, huge buildings and tanks. That business is the
same now as it was prior to 1942. The trial court, taking all
of these factors into consideration, concluded that the use of
the gasoline tanks here involved did not constitute a substantial change in the use of the property. Certainly that cannot
be said to be an tlnreasonable conclusion, yet the majority
states that it is. By a picayunish selection of trivialities, it
asserts there was a change of use because the tanks are larger
than those used formerly and that the fuels stored are to be
used for sale instead of defendants' use in manufacturing.
There is evidence that fuel was sold before 1942, but, in any
event, the change is not substantial considering the extensive
and diversified character of defendants' operations. The ordinance exempts 1tses existing at the time of its passage. Here
the evidence shows that the 1tse of defendants' property is the
same. They are still operating the same business as before
the adoption of the ordinance.
There is no sound basis for distinction between this case and
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 [25 S.Ct. 18, 49 L.Ed.
169], where the court held invalid an ordinance barring gas
works where the property owner had partially erected the
plant when the ordinance was passed. The court there said
(p. 239) : "Being the owner of the land and having partially
erected the works the plaintiff in error had acquired property
rights and was entitled to protection against unconstitutional
encroachments which would have the effect to deprive her
of her property without due process of law." If the right to
complete a partially built structure is protected, certainly
there is a constitutionally protected right to continue to
operate the business exactly the same as before (as the evidence shows). Fuel storage tanks were previously maintained
on the property. There is no more reason for preventing their
enlargement than there would be for stopping the completion
of a gas plant. In fact, this is a stronger case, for here the
industrial business operations are being continued. The true
test has been stated: ''The fact that improved or more efficient instrumentalities are utilized in pursuit of the use does
not exclude it from the category of an 'existing use' within
a town zoning ordinance permitting the continuance of nonconforming existing uses, provided the instrumentalities are
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ordinarily and reasonably adapted to make the use available
to the owner and the original natut·e and purpose of the
undertaking remain unchanged. . . . It is a definitely settled
proposition of law that the 'continuance of a non-conforming
use' existing at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance is a continuance of the same use and not some other
kind of use. In determining whether a non-conforming use
was the same before and after passage of a zoning ordinance,
so as to be permissible, each case must stand on its own facts .
. . . In a recent New York case where a lot in an area zoned
for residential purposes was subject to a non-conforming use
of storage of poles, cable and pipe, the non-conforming use
related to storage and the storage of any other object was a
valid continuation of such non-conforming use unless the
thing stored was vastly different and in itself created new
problems, in which case it could be considered a change of
nse." (Emphasis added.) (Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice,
p. 254.) (See, also, Royal Baking Co. v. Oklahoma City, 182
Okla. 45 [75 P.2d 1105]; Borough of Cheswick v. Bechman,
352 Pa. 79 [42 A.2d 60] ; President &; Trustees of Ossining
v. JJieredith, 73 N.Y.S.2d 897; Mcivor v. JJie1·cer-Fraser Co.,
76 Cal.App.2d 247 [172 P.2d 758] .)
Reference is made to the portion of the ordinance prohibiting structural changes in preexisting buildings. Plainly, that
provision deals with the change in use of the property which
would follow from a structural alteration, that is, for example,
if a residence was so changed that it could be used as a factory.
The essential factor is still the nature of the use of the property. Has that been so altered or extended that the exemption
for nonconforming uses does not apply? If not, as is the case
here, there is no violation of the zoning law.
Finally, it is said that the evidence is highly conflicting
on whether the ordinance discriminates against defendants,
but that there is no finding on the subject, and, therefore,
defendants cannot prevail. There is ample evidence that the
immediate neighborhood around defendants' property is
thickly sprinkled with heavy industry and businesses such as
the storage and sale of fuel. The findings must be liberally
construed to support the judgment. So construed, there is a
sufficient finding on the subject. Defendants, in their answer,
denied that they had violated the ordinance and that the
ordinance applied to their property. That denial was found
to be true. They alleged that their use was ''in keeping with
permits" granted by the county. That was found to be true.
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